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power allow Gilley grudgingly to accept Jiang's undemocratic political 
practices on the promise of economic reform. This acceptance is the cost 
accrued by locating Jiang Zemin within a development trajectory that denies 
socialist China anything but an aberrant role. While Tiger on the Brink offers 
a detailed narrative of Jiang's political career, a more critically engaged 
analysis of Chinese politics and Jiang Zemin demands critique of the cult of 
developmentalism - not to embrace the cult of Mao but to explain further the 
intimate links between developmentalism and Jiang's success in China and 
internationally. 
Tina Mai Chen 
University of Manitoba 
Gerald Friedrnan, State-Making and Labor Movements: France and the 
United States, 1876-1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
The value of comparative history and the rationale underlying it, writes 
historian Colleen Dunlavy, is its "ability to expose otherwise invisible 
paradigms that become second-nature in the historiography of every nation."' 
However, in using the comparative method Gerald Friedman is less concerned 
with illuminating lacunae in nationally-oriented history than in criticizing 
history written from an Orthodox Marxist ("OM," in his shorthand) 
perspective. In State-Making and Labor Movements, Friedman argues that 
labour historians, trapped by their Marxist orientation, have failed to explain 
either the United States' "exceptionally" conservative labour movement and 
absence of significant socialist movements or European, that is, French, labour 
radicalism. 
The problem lies in labour history's focus on the agency of working 
people to the exclusion of the views and actions of other classes - especially 
those classes that stood as allies to labour or possessed the power to restrain 
labour's choices and fields of action. In Friedman's view, the constraints 
working people have faced and the help they have received from allies is more 
important to successhl labour movements than labour activism itself. To the 
not-so-new labour historians this may be heresy, but Friedman steadfastly 
insists that in a world of unequal power relations, labour needed (and 
presumably still needs) allies among sympathetic members of the bourgeoisie 
and state elite to succeed. Drawing upon the social movement theory of Sidney 
Tarrow, Friedman argues that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries organized labour sought alliances and grew more radical to press 
opportunities when state politics was friendly and retreated into conservative 
postures in self-defense when employers counterattacked. These "cycles of 
contention" form the substance of Friedman's comparison between France and 
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the United States. In so doing Friedman seeks to explain why alliances that 
fostered friendly state politics toward labour developed in France at the end of 
the nineteenth century and why the opposite happened in the United States. 
Based upon traditional "qualitative" sources such as newspapers, pamphlets, 
and the like as well as a mass of empirical evidence extensively, but for the 
most part clearly, presented in tables, charts, and graphs, his explanation is 
straightforward: labour movements in these two countries faced different 
opportunities and constraints. 
In France, Friedman argues, the combination of opportunities and 
constraints favoured the development of syndicalist-style unionism. After the 
establishment of the Third Republic in the mid-1870s, republican elites' 
tenuous hold on office in the face of opposition from the monarchist right and 
employers prompted them to centralize state power and forced them to seek 
worlung-class support. Pursuing a policy of labour reform that promoted 
collective bargaining and arbitration, these elites hoped to produce a stable, 
"mature," union movement embodying republican principles while providing 
support at the ballot box. However, these policies instead created a context 
favourable to revolutionary syndicalism. In a nation governed by a unitary 
state, French unions discovered that class-wide appeals to workers made sense 
over localized issues and that by broadening strikes they could prompt quick 
state intervention on their side. French employers, unable to mount any 
effective, organized response before 1914, were unable to break the front 
forged between radical and centrist republicans and their working-class 
supporters. The result was a radical, inclusive labour movement by the first 
decade of the twentieth century. 
By contrast, in the last decades of the nineteenth century in the United 
States the national state was unlikely to assist unions in any comparable way. 
With no threat to the state from reactionaries, argues Friedman, excepting 
southern slaveholders, who were put down during the Civil War, state elites had 
no reason to build alliances with labour. To explain the one period in which 
political leaders courted the labour vote and delivered favourable legislation on 
the state level, the 1870s and 1880s, Friedman points to the incredibly close 
margins of victory in state and national elections between Democrats and 
Republicans. As long as labour could tip the balance, it exercised some real 
power, encouraging political action, inclusive unionism, and militancy. This 
also explains the period of tremendous union growth and strike activity of the 
1870s and 1880s. However, according to Friedman, labour's very success in 
the United States proved its undoing. Frightened by industrial conflict and 
threats to property, judges - upper class men of property, operating in a 
branch of the government free from democratic restraints - overturned labour 
reform legislation in defense of property rights and cleared the path for 
employer and state repression of organized labour by concluding that collective 
action was illegal. At the same time, declining voter turnout and the political 
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realignment of the 1890s, which broke the balance between the two parties, 
eroded any ability labour had to influence national politics. Wholesale 
repression of inclusive unions by employers and the state, buttressed with 
welfare capitalism (which, Friedman tells us, American workers preferred to 
paternalism) followed. American labour leaders prudently concluded that 
narrow, apolitical trade unionism was the safest way to go in the new century. 
Friedman's approach and argument have much to recommend it. To begin 
with, I think his criticism of Orthodox Marxism is healthy and well- 
intentioned. Friedman's emphasis on history made by people - from the state 
policymaker to the union activist - rather than immutable forces restores 
agency and contingency to our understanding of labour movements. Similarly, 
his handling of republicanism as the ideology driving both the development of 
liberal states and labour movements helps to ground them in their historical 
contexts as well as illuminate the motivations of the historical actors behind 
them in a way that Marxism is unable to. The common republican heritage of 
labour activists, middle-class reformers, and certain state elites helps to 
explain why these people could and did form sympathetic bonds and alliances 
in the middle and late nineteenth century. The same is true when he links the 
contrasting French and U.S. uses of republicanism with state formation and the 
building of political alliances and parties to show how employers in the United 
States successfilly mobilized and those in France did not. Lastly, by paying 
attention to classes and actors other than labour Friedman draws attention to 
those in society who exercised power and to what ends. Since it is difficult to 
see when labour ever exercised a preponderance of power, except for brief 
moments, this orientation makes sense if we are to understand why labour 
movements succeed or fail. For Friedman, this approach holds the key to 
explaining American exceptionalism because employers do not respond to 
unionization in the same ways and the ability of employers to respond to 
unions is conditioned by the state. His comparative framework makes this 
apparent. 
Indeed, the comparative framework highlights what was distinctive about 
France and the United States and in so doing shows how the institutional 
environment and actors in other classes crucially affected organized labour. 
But is Friedman's comparison of these two countries valid and does it bear out 
his analysis? On the one hand, I think he makes a good case for comparing 
France and the United States. However, I am left with the feeling that for all 
of comparative history's expository value, Friedrnan sometimes slides over 
matters of specificity in need of explanation or that are contrary to the larger 
argument. In other words, is the argument too neat? For example, I wonder 
about Friedman's characterization of U.S. southern slaveholders. While they 
may have led the South out of the Union, it seems a bit much to equate them 
with reactionary French monarchists - were they really such an 
antirepublican elite? Similarly, it seems a something of an overstatement to 
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say that welfare capitalism in the United States succeeded in legitmizing 
employer authority in the workplace. Yes, welfare capitalism did fit the U.S. 
better than paternalism by purporting to treat workers as individuals and as 
equals, welfare capitalists did take pains to conceal their paternalism, and 
many workers did enjoy the material benefits accruing to them from welfarist 
programs. But Friedman tends to assert this point more than he demonstrates 
it. After all, there have been numerous examples of American workers seeing 
the paternalism underneath the welfare patina and questioning employers' 
workplace authority. These imperfections make the comparative framework a 
little less tidy. 
State-Making and Labor Movements is sure to garner attention and 
provoke some controversy. If Friedman's comparison seems a bit strained at 
points and if lurking in his argument is the Marxist point that workers and 
employers do have opposing, conflicting interests it nevertheless makes a 
thought-provoking argument and stands as a model of what a broader kind 
labour history can be. 
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Shani D'Cruze, Crimes of Outrage: Sex, Violence and Victorian Working 
Women (DeKalb, 11: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998). 
In Crimes of Outrage, Shani D'Cruze speaks of violence, of violence in 
the streets and the home and the factory, of brawls and beatings and barbarity 
in the lives of working women in Victorian England. Most of all, D'Cmze 
speaks of sexual violence, of horrific physical attacks by men and women's, at 
times, successfU1 resistance. D'Cruze concludes, "violence or its possibility 
was an ongoing component in nineteenth-century working women's lives" 
(20). 
Spatial analysis ("space and place") is a critical aspect of her argument, as 
D'Cruze moves with remarkable agility through village life, from assaults in 
the home to sexual dangers at work - "reinforced," she notes, "by the 
patriarchaVfamilia1 structures of authority in the workplace" (3) - to frightful 
aspects of courtship and leisure to public neighborhood spaces and, finally, to 
the courtroom. The author is particularly skilled at mapping the byways of 
typical English villages. By the end of the book, readers will have a much 
greater appreciation for the relationships between the built environment and 
human interaction. 
